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This paper develops a rule for setting periodically and internationally a carbon-
dioxide atmospheric stock limiting tax in a world inhabited by expected utility 
maximizing stakeholders facing diminishing mean and increasing variance of their 
output level due to climate change. The stakeholders are classified as poor, hence 
unable and/or unwilling to pay, countries and rich countries. Due to ideological and 
cultural differences, the rich countries' willingness to pay the tax is not identical. 
Consequently, the number of complying rich countries diminishes with the tax level.   
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The atmosphere is an indivisible open-access natural resource. In the absence of 
property rights, private formation of markets for the externalities created by 
greenhouse gasses’ emissions, climate change in particular, is impossible. The policy 
measures for controlling these externalities are classified as quantity-based 
instruments and price-based instruments. Theoretical comparisons of these 
instruments have followed Weitzman’s (1974) generic analysis of stock-based 
externalities, which linked their relative efficiency to the relative slopes of the 
marginal benefits and costs of control. In the context of greenhouse gasses, Pizer 
(2002), Hoel and Karp (2002), Newell and Pizer, (2003) and Fischer and Newell 
(2008) have provided arguments in favour of price-based instruments.  
Carbon tax (or price) has been implemented in several Scandinavian and 
European countries, in Canada and New Zealand and, most recently, in Australia. An 
analysis of factors; such as free-riding, overstated expectations and guilt; affecting the 
efficiency of a unilateral carbon tax has been provided by Levy (2011). Since the 
atmosphere is indivisible and climate change is a global stock-based externality, an 
internationally broader cooperation and planning is desirable.  
The objective of this paper is to provide an international planner a tax rule for 
limiting the atmospheric stock of the principal greenhouse gas, carbon-dioxide, in a 
world inhabited by stakeholders facing intensified economic uncertainty due to 
climate change. As in Levy (2011), the stakeholders are divided into poor, hence 
unable and/or unwilling to pay, countries and rich, but not necessarily willing to 
pay, countries. The construction of the rule is based on five premises. The first one is 
that the controllable carbon-dioxide emissions are by-product of fossil-fuel used in a 
broadly defined human productive activity. The second premise is that the 
accumulation of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere affects climate and a deterioration 
of climate diminishes output mean and increases the output variance. The third 
premise is that stakeholders are risk-averse and maximize expected utilities from their 
random net profit. The fourth one is that the international planner takes into account 
the stakeholders expected utility maximizing emissions, but is bounded rational in the 
following sense. Due to compounded complexity and for practicality, the international 
planner does not maximize the sum of the discounted net benefits over a planning 
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horizon. As is commonly practiced by central banks with regard to interest rate, the 
international planner sets the carbon tax at the beginning of each period at a flat rate 
required for achieving an atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock target. The fifth premise 
is that the stakeholders are sovereign countries in various stages of economic 
development. They have different ability and willingness to pay for carbon-dioxide 
emissions and cannot be forced to pay the carbon tax set by the international planner. 
Hence, the higher the tax rate, the smaller the number of complying countries.  
Taking into account the first, second and third premises, section 2 derives the 
effect of carbon tax on the emissions of countries’ representative agents. With the 
fourth and fifth premises in mind, section 3 incorporates the agents’ expected utility 
maximizing carbon-dioxide emissions into the motion equation of the atmospheric 
carbon stock and formulates the periodical carbon-tax rate required for limiting the 
atmospheric stock to a predetermined level with an allowance for a negative 
relationship between the number of complying countries and the carbon-tax level. 
Section 4 concludes with a discussion of the properties of the constructed carbon-tax 
rule. 
 
2. Production impeding climate change and agents’ emissions   
Consider a world where the carbon-dioxide emissions of the representative agent of 
each country i 1, 2,3,..., N=  at time t, itx , are proportional to his fossil-fuel 
consumption, ite . That is, 
it i itx e= α                       (1) 
where the positive scalar iα  reflects the emission-intensity of country i’s production 
process’ fossil-fuel consumption. Suppose, further, that country i’s representative 
agent’s output at t, ity , is proportional to his fossil-fuel consumption, but uncertain:  
it it it ity (a )e= + ε .                    (2) 
The positive scalar ita  is the expected marginal product of fossil fuel and dependent 
on the climate at period t. The additional factor, itε , is a zero-mean normally 
distributed random deviation from this expected marginal product caused by random 
disturbances in the representative agent’s production environment. That is, 
2
it it(0, )ε σN . It is assumed that the variance of this random deviation intensifies 
with the deterioration of the climate caused by an increasing divergence from the 
 4 
climate-wise ideal atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock. As countries have different 
geographical conditions, the climate-wise ideal atmospheric stock is country-specific. 
It is defined, henceforth, as the stock level associated with both the smallest marginal 
product’s variance, 2iσ , and the largest expected marginal product, ia 0> , of fossil 
fuel for the representative agent of country i. With t 1S −  denoting the atmospheric 
stock of carbon-dioxide at the beginning of period t, oiS  the ideal stock, and i 0β >  the 
sensitivity of country i’s marginal product’s variance to climate change, the variance 
of itε  and of the agent’s marginal product at t is expressed as: 
2 2 o 2
it i i t 1 i[1 (S S ) ]−σ = σ +β − .                   (3) 
As also assumed, the representative agent’s expected marginal product of fossil fuel 
decreases from the maximal level ia  with the divergence of the actual atmospheric 
carbon-dioxide stock from the climate-wise ideal stock. This assumption is formally 
represented by: 
o 2
it i i t 1 ia a / [1 (S S ) ]−= + γ −          (4) 
where i 0γ >  reflects the sensitivity of the agent’s expected marginal product to 
climate change. 
Since it i itx e= α  implies that it it ie x /= α , country i’s representative agent’s 
production function can be portrayed as: 
i
it it i ito 2
i i t 1 i
ay ( / ) x
[1 (S S ) ]−
 
= + ε α α + γ − 
.       (5) 
With the price of fossil fuel for country i’s representative agent at t being equal to itq , 
the imputed price of carbon-dioxide emission before tax is it iq / α . With the price of 
the product at t being equal to itp  and the carbon-tax rate it 0τ ≥ , the net profit of 
country i’s representative agent at t is:  
i
it it it i it it i it ito 2
i i t 1 i
ap ( / ) x [(q / ) ]x
[1 (S S ) ]−
 
π = + ε α − α + τ α + γ − 
.   (6) 
This net profit is normally distributed with  
it i
it it i it ito 2
i i t 1 i
p aE( ) (q / ) x
[1 (S S ) ]−
 
π = − α − τ α + γ − 
      (7) 
and 
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2 2 o 2 2 2
it it i i t 1 i i itVAR( ) {p [1 (S S ) ] / }x−π = σ +β − α .       (8) 
The representative agent derives utility from net profit. As suggested for 
tractability by Freund (1956), his utility function is taken to be negative exponential: 
it i itu 1 exp( R )= − − π          (9) 
where iR 0>  represents the agent’s degree of absolute risk aversion. Since net profit 
is random, and in agreement with Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem, each 
country’s representative agent chooses an emission level that maximizes his expected 
utility. As demonstrated by Freund (1956) with a normally distributed utility 
generating variable, 
it i it i it(u ) 1 exp{ 0.5R [E( ) 0.5R VAR( )]}Ε = − − π − π .               (10) 
Consequently, country i’s representative agent’s decision problem can be expressed 
as: 
2 2 o 2 2 2it i
it i it it i it i i t 1 i i ito 2
i i t 1 iit
x
p amax (q / ) x 0.5R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }x
[1 (S S ) ] −−
   − α − τ − σ +β − α  α + γ −   
 
                            .(11) 
As the second-order condition for maximum is satisfied, it is obtained from the first-
order condition that the expected utility maximising carbon-dioxide emission level at t 
for country i’s representative agent is equal to the ratio of his expected marginal net 
profit to his marginal cost of risk-bearing: 
it i
it i ito 2
* i i t 1 i
it 2 2 o 2 2
i it i i t 1 i i
p a (q / )
[1 (S S ) ]x
R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }
−
−
− α − τ
α + γ −
=
σ +β − α
.                         (12) 
 
3. Stock targeting carbon-tax with abstinence  
The accumulation of carbon-dioxide reflects the imbalance in the atmospheric carbon 
cycle; namely, the carbon-dioxide emissions of humans, animals, plants and bacteria 
beyond the sum of the molecules photosynthesised by plants, sunk into the Earth’s 
surface and disseminated into space. With it 1L −  denoting the population of country i at 
the beginning of period t, the change in the atmospheric stock of carbon-dioxide 
during period t is:
 N
*
t t 1 it 1 it t t 1
i 1
S S L x z S− − −
=
− = + −δ∑ .                            (13)  
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The variable tz  indicates the net (of photosynthesised carbon-dioxide) aggregate 
emission of wildlife at period t, and is assumed, for simplicity, to be accurately 
expected by the international planner at the beginning of the period. The parameter 
0 1< δ <  denotes the natural depletion (through sinking into the Earth’s surface and 
dissemination into space) rate of atmospheric carbon-dioxide. 
Let us assume that the world has rN  rich countries, which can pay carbon tax. 
The rest, rN N− , are poor and stress their low per capita income and relatively low 
past and present emissions as reasons for abstinence from an internationally 
coordinated emission-control scheme. In the following simple illustration, the rich 
countries are taken to be identical with respect to technology, climate, fossil-fuel 
price, product price and population size, and so are also the poor countries. However, 
due to ideological and cultural differences, the rich countries do not have identical 
willingness to pay carbon tax. We let the number of rich countries willing to pay an 
internationally set carbon-tax, rc rN N≤ , diminish with the carbon-tax rate, t 0τ > , in 








                   (14) 
where the parameter 0θ >  is the average effect of the carbon-tax rate on the ratio of 
non-complying to complying rich countries; henceforth, the rich countries’ non-
compliance coefficient. We assume that the non-complying countries do not 
implement domestic emission-control schemes.  
With this in mind, the international planner sets the periodical carbon-tax rate 
so as to limit the stock of atmospheric carbon dioxide at the end of period t to a 
targeted level tŜ . That is, the international planner sets the periodical carbon-tax rate 
to satisfy the following equality: 
* * *
t rc r rc r rc r ra r p p t t 1Ŝ N (t)L x [N N (t)]L x (N N )L x z (1 )S −= + − − − + + −δ .            (15) 
Recalling (12), the emissions of the representative agent of a rich cooperative (rc) 
country are 
rt r
rt r to 2
* r r t 1 r
rct 2 2 o 2 2
r rt r r t 1 r r
p a (q / )
[1 (S S ) ]x
R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }
−
−
− α − τ
α + γ −
=
σ +β − α
                (16) 




* r r t 1 r
rat 2 2 o 2 2
r rt r r t 1 r r
p a (q / )
[1 (S S ) ]x




α + γ −
=
σ +β − α
                (17) 
and the emissions of the representative agent of a poor country are 
pt p
pt po 2
p p t 1 p*
pt 2 2 o 2 2
p pt p p t 1 p p
p a
(q / )
[1 (S S ) ]
x




α + γ −
=
σ +β − α
.                (18) 
By substituting (14), (16), (17) and (18) into (15), the stock-targeting carbon-tax rate 
should satisfy: 
*rt r
rt r to 2
r r t 1 rr
t r* 2 2 o 2 2
t r rt r r t 1 r r
rt r
rt ro 2
r r t 1 rr
r r* 2 2 o 2 2
t r rt r r t 1 r r
pt p
o 2
p p t 1 p
r p
p a (q / )
[1 (S S ) ]NŜ L
1 R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }
p a (q / )
[1 (S S ) ]NN L
1 R {p [1 (S S ) ] / }
p a







− α − τ
α + γ −
=
+ θτ σ +β − α
− α
  α + γ −
+ − + θτ σ +β − α 
α + γ −
+ −
pt p
t t 12 2 o 2 2
p pt p p t 1 p p
(q / )
]
z (1 )S .
R {p [1 (S S ) ] / } −−
− α
+ + −δ
σ +β − α
                    (19) 
By multiplying both sides of this equality by *t(1 )+ θτ  and rearranging terms, the 
international planner’s atmospheric stock targeting carbon-tax rate rule is: 
 
pt prt r
r p p pto 2r r r rto 2
p t 1 pr t 1 r
t t t 12 2 o 2 2 2 o 2
r rt r r t 1 r p p t p p t 1 p
t t t 1
*
t
p ap a (N N )L qN L q
[1 (S S ) ][1 (S S ) ]
Ŝ z (1 )S
R p [1 (S S ) ] R p [1 (S S ) ]





− α −α −
+ γ −+ γ −
+ − + + − δ
σ +β − σ +β −
θ − − − δ +
    
    
     
  
  
    τ =
pt prt r
r p p pto 2r r r r rto 2
p t 1 pr t 1 r
2 2 o 2 2 2 o 2
r rt r r t 1 r p p t p p t 1 p
p ap a (N N )L qN L q
[1 (S S ) ][1 (S S ) ]
R p [1 (S S ) ] R p [1 (S S ) ]
−−
− −
− θα −α α − θ −
+ γ −+ γ −
−
σ +β − σ +β −
     
     
      
  
  
    
 




This paper provide an international planner a rule for setting a flat carbon tax that 
limits greenhouse gasses’ stock to a predetermined level in a world where each 
stakeholder faces, due to climate change, diminishing mean and increasing variance 
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of the marginal product of his fossil-fuel consumption and maximizes expected utility 
from the uncertain net profit. The construction of the rule took into account that some 
of the stakeholders are poor countries, hence unable and/or unwilling to pay the 
carbon tax. It also took into account that, due to variation in willingness to pay, the 
number of the cooperating rich countries diminishes with the tax rate. For illustration, 
the rule was constructed for the tractable case where the poor countries are identical 
and so are also the rich countries, but with the aforesaid exception of non-identical 
willingness to pay carbon tax. For numerical simulations and application, the rule can 
be reformulated for the real case, where all the countries are different, with non-
identical parameters. 
An inspection of the constructed rule reveals that the international planner’s 
carbon-tax rate decreases with the greenhouse gasses’ stock-target, tŜ , with the 
natural depletion rate of greenhouse gasses, δ , and with the prices of fossil fuel in the 
rich countries and in the poor countries, rtq and ptq . The international planner’s 
carbon-tax rate rises with the expected marginal product of energy in the rich and the 
poor countries attainable under ideal climate, ra  and pa , with the emission-intensities 
of the poor countries’ production process’ fossil-fuel consumption, pα  and rα , with 
the poor countries’ population, r p(N N )L−  and with the expected periodical net 
aggregate carbon-dioxide emissions of wildlife, tz . Despite the tax-increasing effect 
of the fossil-fuel consumption’s emission-intensities, the carbon tax does not 
necessarily rise with the rich countries’ population, r rN L . It can decrease with the 
population of the rich countries when the value of the rich countries’ non-compliance 
coefficient, θ , is sufficiently low, as the burden is carried by a sufficiently large 
number of cooperating rich countries.  
The inspection also reveals that the international planner’s periodical carbon-
tax rate decreases with the poor countries’ representative agents’ risk-bearing-cost 
coefficient, 2 2 o 2p pt p p t 1 pR p [1 (S S ) ]−σ +β − . More particularly, the carbon tax decreases 
with the poor countries’ degree of absolute risk aversion, pR , variance of marginal 
output under ideal climate, 2pσ , and sensitivity of the marginal product’s variance to 
climate change, pβ . The effect of the rich countries’ representative agents’ risk-
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bearing-cost coefficient, 2 2 o 2r rt r r t 1 rR p [1 (S S ) ]−σ +β − , on the carbon tax set by the 
international planner is not clear.  
The inspection further reveals that the international planner’s periodical 
carbon tax rises with both the rich and poor countries’ representative agents’ expected 
marginal profit coefficients o 2rt r r t 1 r rt{p a / [(1 (S S ) )] q }−+ γ − −  and 
o 2
pt p p t 1 p pt{p a / [1 (S S ) )] q }−+ γ − − , respectively, and in a rate intensified by the rich 
countries’ non-compliance coefficient, θ . This property indicates that the 
international planner’s periodical carbon tax rate decreases with the rich and poor 
countries’ expected marginal product’ sensitivity to climate change, rγ  and pγ . In 
conjunction with the previously identified moderating effect of the poor countries’ 
risk-bearing-cost coefficient, this property also indicates that the tax rate decreases 
with the deviation of the atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock from the climate-wise 
ideal level for the poor countries, o 2t 1 p(S S )− − . The direction of the overall effect of the 
deviation of the atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock from the climate-wise ideal level 
for the rich countries, o 2t 1 p(S S )− − , on the international planner’s periodical carbon tax 
is not clear.  
Finally, as long as the carbon-dioxide stock target is set below the actual initial 
stock minus its natural depletion and plus the expected net aggregate emissions of 
wildlife during the period (i.e., t t t 1Ŝ z (1 )S −< + − δ ), the international planner’s 
periodical carbon tax rises with the rich countries’ non-compliance coefficient, θ ; 
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